



Neither participation nor revolution. 

















Scholars and students of Islamist movements are divided over the issue of Islamists 
commitment to democracy and a number of studies attempted to discover the true 
nature of Islamist parties. This paper rejects this approach and argues that the 
behaviour of Islamist parties can be better understood through an analysis of the 
constraints and opportunities that their surrounding environment provides. 
Specifically, the paper aims at explaining the choice of the Moroccan Jamiat al-Adl 
wal-Ihsan neither to participate in institutional politics nor undertake violent actions 
to transform the regime. This is done through an examination of its relations with the 
other political actors. The paper argues that the Jamiat al-Adl wal-Ihsan’s behaviour 
is as much the product of rational thinking as it is of ideology and provides evidence 
to support this claim. Such findings are important not only in the Moroccan context, 
but contribute to a growing literature claiming that Islamist movements should be 
treated as rational political actors operating under ‘environmental’ constraints and 
opportunities.   
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Introduction: Islamism between ideology and rationality 
 Academic and policy-making debates on Middle Eastern and North African 
politics very often address the role and nature of Islamist parties and movements. At a 
time when democratisation is perceived to be the only solution for the problems 
affecting both these societies and the international system as a whole, the popularity 
of Islamist parties is very controversial. On the one hand, Islamist movements 
attempting to play the game of political participation are treated with a considerable 
amount of suspicion, as both domestic opponents and international actors fear their 
intentions. On the other hand there is the recognition that without the inclusion of 
Islamists in a regenerated political system, democratisation is very much unlikely to 
occur. Thus some scholars and policy-makers see Islamists as a potential pro-
democracy resource, while others see them as enemies of democracy and potentially 
authoritarian. Such polarising attitudes are generally the product of the scholarly 
attempt to discover the ‘true nature’ of such movements, particularly with respect to 
their democratic credentials and commitment.  
While it is recognised today that Islamist groups are very different from each 
other in terms of ideological differences and methods of action, this has not stopped 
scholars from investigating specific groups with the objective of determining a priori 
their ethos and therefore their potential role in processes of regime change. Broadly 
speaking, there are three types of radical Islamist groups across the region. The first 
group includes movements such as Hamas and Hezbullah, which combine traits of 
social movements, political parties and national liberation movement (Hroub, 2006; 
Palmer Harik, 2004). The second group includes the salafi movements bent on the use 
of violence to achieve their political objectives such as the Algerian Al-Qaeda in the 
Maghreb (former GSPC). The third group is made up of all those movements that do 
not employ violence and function as broad social movements (Wiktorowicz, 2004), 
but also have a specifically Islamist political agenda, which leads them to be involved 
in institutional politics when the opportunity arises. Recently, much greater attention 
has been paid to the latter group because of their direct or indirect involvement in 
political and institutional changes. It is these movements, rhetorically committed to 
peaceful democratisation, that have attracted much scholarly attention.    
Investigating such mainstream movements is certainly worthwhile because it 
allows scholars to gain an insight on how such movements operate, how they are 
structured, how the leaders are selected and what their main policy concerns are. 
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However, such investigations remain highly problematic and subject to a considerable 
degree of speculation when it comes to determine beyond doubt whether they have an 
authoritarian or a democratic ethos. For example, recent analyses of the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood have led to opposing conclusions regarding how the movement 
would operate within a more democratic polity. While Khalil (2006) argued quite 
strongly that democracy would not survive were the Brotherhood to take power, 
Mona El-Ghobashy (2005) comes to a radically different conclusion having analysed 
the ideological and strategic metamorphosis the Brotherhood went through in recent 
decades. Such studies therefore lead quite quickly to a rather sterile and fruitless 
debate because they attempt to find an ‘essence’ that is impossible to correctly pin 
down, as all political movements, while having an ideology to propagate and policies 
to implement, have to contend with institutional constraints such as electoral and 
constitutional rules, the presence of other political parties or the decisions of the 
courts. Furthermore, such studies assume that, once identified, the ethos is not subject 
to change. This might not in fact be the case as demonstrated in other contexts when 
seemingly extremist and anti-democratic parties went through considerable changes 
and even became supporters of democracy.1 Thus the surrounding environment 
matters and influences the choices Islamist movements make and the strategies they 
adopt. Thus, attempting to determine a priori the true ethos of any movement neglects 
the relevance of the context within which they act. In addition, ‘ideologised’ analyses 
of Islamist organisations tend to marginalise the contribution of the comparative 
politics literature on political formations, specifically the trait of rationality of 
behaviour. Islamist political organisations should be studied through the same 
assumptions of rationality that are utilised for other non-Islamist formations. Thus, 
costs and benefits analysis is a trait of Islamist organisations, which take into account 
the surrounding environment and the internal dynamics of the group to constantly 
shift positions in order to advance their agenda. This study does not want to underplay 
the significance of an ideology inspired by divine revelation, which is a fundamental 
trait of Islamist movements, and it recognises its relevance, particularly when 
compared to the beliefs that secular parties espouse. However, the religious dimension 
cannot be the only lens through which Islamist movements should be analysed 
because many of their activities and their sloganeering focus on very practical 
political matters and are imbued with pragmatism. In other contexts, such as the case 
of Christian democracy, realpolitik pragmatism was just as important as the religious 
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ideology that inspired the parties at the beginning. This does not mean that Islamist 
groups do not have unique characteristics, just as Communist parties have, but this 
uniqueness should not place them in a special category beyond the reach of 
comparison with other movements dealing with the every-day constraints of the 
political game.  As Wiktorowicz (2004) argued, ‘Islamic activism is not sui generis.’ 
With this in mind, it is possible to better grasp the strategies and activities of Islamists 
in a framework of rational behaviour. If the literature keeps looking at these parties 
simply through the dimension of religion and religious ideology, it runs the risk of not 
capturing an important part of their development and evolution.       
This paper, building on Brumberg’s (2002) work on Islamist parties, rejects 
the approach whereby it is possible to determine a priori the true ethos of a political 
actor by analysing documents, statements, structure and past behaviour. If interpreted 
in isolation from the surrounding institutional setting and in a political vacuum, the 
political actors’ true nature will be highly dependent on the scholar’s pre-conceptions 
and biased selection of evidence. Rather, this paper will examine the Moroccan 
Justice and Spirituality Group, Jamiat al-Adl wal-Ihsan (Al Adl from now on), in its 
institutional and political environment in order to explain its refusal to both participate 
to the Moroccan political game and to undertake more militant actions to change the 
regime they have so much contempt for. The strategies and tactics of the movement 
will be explored in the context of political rationality. It is assumed that it analysing 
the dynamic interactions that such movement has with the other relevant actors in the 
Moroccan system contributes better grasp its political choices. Explaining the 
behaviour of the movement through rationalistic assumptions allows for a better 
understanding of how the ideology and the strategies of the al Adl dynamically 
change in a relationship of mutual influence.  
The case of the al Adl is particularly interesting because it allows the 
possibility of examining how a prominent Islamist movement manages the balance 
between revolution and participation in an authoritarian context while retaining 
considerable popularity among ordinary Moroccans. The ability of the al Adl to adapt 
to the environment within which it operates indicates that the movement, despite its 
strong ideological positions on a number of matters, is capable to strategise and think 
rationally about the methods through which it can gain strength and, possibly, achieve 
its objectives. This study contributes to a growing literature attempting to explain the 
behaviour of Islamist movements under authoritarian conditions by looking at how 
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institutions and interactions with other actors shape behaviour (Hafez, 2003; Clark, 
2004; Lust-Okar, 2005; Schwedler, 2006).  
The first part of the paper will briefly outline how the Moroccan political 
system operates and describes the al Adl’s position within it. The paper will then 
briefly summarise the structure and work of the association. Finally, the focus will be 
on the ‘environmental’ constraints that explain why the Justice and Spirituality Group 
pursues a ‘third way’ to affect political, social and economic change.  
It is this very decision that presents an interesting puzzle for the literature on 
opposition movements during periods of political liberalisation in authoritarian 
settings. Within it, it usually emerges that during political openings, opposition 
movements normally attempt to access the state institutions previously closed off in 
order to gain bargaining power for future confrontations with the regime with the 
long-term objective of changing the rules of political competition. Multiparty 
elections, even though are engineered by the regime and unable to conform to 
acceptable standards of freedom and fairness, represent significant moments for 
opposition parties to have an enhanced  role in political life and measure their popular 
appeal. As Pripstein-Posusney (2002) argues ‘by withholding participation, exposing 
and challenging electoral violations, and/or critiquing the electoral rules themselves, 
independent activists and opposition parties can diminish the executive’s credibility.’ 
The al Adl not only persistently refrained from participating, but remained and still 
remains completely outside the institutional game, including round-tables and 
meetings regarding the details of electoral procedures. This is despite its consistent 
calls for the establishment of procedural democracy. In addition, the movement has 
consistently refused to be co-opted the institutions of the state. This is in contrast with 
the behaviour of the vats majority of Islamist movements across the Arab world, 
including the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development or the Brotherhoods of 
Egypt and Jordan. At the same time, the al Adl has also refused to call for regime 
change through violence. It is contended that the very specific conditions and 
constraints of the Moroccan system determine such behaviour because the al Adl 
perceives the course of action it has taken to be the one that will eventually deliver its 
fundamental objective: the creation of an Islamic state.   
The al Adl is at times accused of espousing a self-defeating strategy because it 
does not play the game it supports (procedural democracy) and, at the same time, 
refuses to play the revolutionary subversive card. This makes it an interesting case to 
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examine not only for the wider literature on opposition movements, but also for the 
more specific literature dealing with Islamist parties. In most other contexts across the 
Arab world, Islamist parties when given the opportunity, play the electoral game even 
in the knowledge that they game is rigged. Providing an explanation for the al Adl’s 
seemingly puzzling behaviour contributes to fill the gap on opposition movements’ 
strategies in authoritarian settings and might give some insights on how policy-
makers could deal with such political actors.         
This research is by no means attempting to marginalise the ‘ideological’ 
explanation for the stances that the al Adl takes with respect to its choices. Thus, it is 
important to emphasise how the ideological tenets worked out by the leader Sheikh 
Abdessalam Yassine are very relevant for the type of activism that characterises the 
movement. This is in line with recent developments in the literature on Islamist 
groups, which attempts to interpret Islamism as a traditional ideology, which should 
not be subjected to secular bias (Browers, 2005). However, the ideology of the 
movement and the thinking of its leader have been explored in some detail elsewhere 
(Zeghal, 2005; Lauziere, 2005; Maddy-Weitzman, 2003) and it is the purpose of this 
research to instead concentrate the attention on how such ideological stances are 
operationalised in practice in the daily activities of the movement and how they are at 
times modified for strategic considerations. Ideology and rational choices are 
therefore in a dynamic relationship, where ideological tenets do not necessarily trump 
all else. The religious dimension of the movement should not obscure the fact that the 
objectives it wants to achieve and the transformation of society it envisages are very 
much ‘political’ and require a rationalistic understanding of the reality surrounding 
the movement.   
 
Morocco’s ‘liberalised autocracy’ 
 In 1997, Rémy Leveau (1997) defined the country as having a ‘political 
system based on authoritarian pluralism.’ Since independence the Royal family, and 
more specifically King Hassan II, ruled the country with an iron fist, but almost 
always permitted a degree of political pluralism in the form of competing political 
parties and civil society organisations. This pluralism was designed to give the 
impression that Morocco was always moving towards some sort of democratization 
and it was maintained mostly for external consumption. As Howe (2001) highlighted 
‘Morocco [was] generally respected by world powers as a stable constitutional 
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monarchy engaged in the democratic process and as an Islamic voice of moderation.’ 
In reality, genuine democratization never materialised, although King Hassan II began 
a more convincing move towards significant political change (known as l’alternance) 
in the early 1990s when he offered the Socialist Party, usually marginalised in 
perpetual opposition, the opportunity to head the government. This offer was 
eventually accepted in 1997. This change seemed to signal the genuine intention to 
move the country away from authoritarianism and to prepare the terrain for his son, 
Mohammed VI, who would succeed him with the objective of further modernising 
Morocco.  
The early days of Mohammed’s VI reign were euphoric ones for both ordinary 
Moroccans and for political actors who had for a considerable amount of time called 
for the increasing liberalisation that the new King was promoting. Despite 
maintaining a solid grip on policy-making power through his constitutional 
prerogatives, Mohammed VI set about liberalising society. According to one civil 
society activist the new King ‘allowed it [Morocco] to breathe’ (Author’s Interview, 
2005) after many years of suffocating repression. In a rather short space of time after 
coming to power much progress occurred so that Howe was able to state ‘nowhere 
else in the Arab world has the public mood of fear changed so dramatically in so little 
time, not have citizens acquired such extensive freedom of press, speech and 
assembly (Howe, 2001).’ However, the programme of democratic reforms was 
disappointing in the institutional and political domains. For example, there has been 
no revision of the constitution, which gives considerable executive powers to the 
unelected King. Nevertheless, Mohammed VI continued to integrate the Islamist 
party, the Party for Justice and Development (PJD), into Parliament. While severe 
limitations and constraints are placed on the party itself in terms of its ability to run 
candidates at elections (Willis, 2004), the PJD has been able to take advantage of the 
situation and has demonstrated both electoral strength and determination to remain in 
opposition.  
The country, despite strong economic growth, is still largely mired in poverty, 
illiteracy and corruption. The lack of genuine political change is held responsible for 
this state of affairs, as the King continues to dominate policy-making without any 
accountability, while political parties in government continue to suffer from their lack 
of policy-making autonomy in key areas and continue therefore to be further 
discredited (Willis, 2002). Initially, it seemed that the strategy of ‘enlightened 
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despotism’ would last until the King’s power base was consolidated and he could 
move towards a new strategy based on the reinvention of a new ruling bargain with 
citizens (Maghraoui, 2001), but there never seemed to be the necessary political 
willingness to deliver on genuine reforms that would limit his own power. Supporters 
of King Mohammed VI emphasise that he brought a new generation of technocrats to 
power and delivered on some of his promise such as the reform of the family law (El 
Ghissassi, 2006), but in eight years in power it is still far too little in a country that 
needs a radical transformation.  
 The Casablanca bombings of May 2003 were a tremendous shock for the 
country. While the King authorised a heavy clampdown on Islamists that led some to 
argue that the country was sliding back to the days of Hassan’s repressive policies, he 
also took two progressive initiatives. First of all a new family law, which improves 
women’s rights, was passed and subsequently an Equity and Reconciliation 
Commission aimed at providing closure on past human rights abuses was launched. 
Such reforms however should not detract from the fact that since the attacks, the King 
has made full use of his constitutional prerogatives and marginalised further the 
political parties in government. In addition, no changes to the Constitution were 
introduced despite pressure from a number of social and political actors to do so. 
Finally, censorship and repression of the press increased. According to French 
journalist J.P. Tuquoi (2006), it is unelected technocrats and advisors who dominate 
policy-making through their personal influence on the King einforcing the perception 
of authoritarian rule. Whatever the King’s own personal involvement in the running 
of the country, the Moroccan transition to democracy has stalled (Cavatorta, 2005). 
As long as the institutional and constitutional framework is not modified with the 
objective of diminishing the King’s executive powers in favour of elected officials, it 
is difficult to see how Morocco is making progress towards democratisation.  
While the civil society space that Mohammed VI opened up has not been 
closed down and is indeed the only realm where genuine opposition politics can take 
place (Cavatorta, 2006), institutional reforms in favour of accountability have not 
occurred. The ‘de-politicisation’ (Maghroui, 2002) of the population is both evident 
and potentially dangerous because it plays in the hands of violent radical groups that 
have been so far very marginal actors on the Moroccan scene, but could build up 
legitimacy and resources over time. Cementing the Kingdom’s political and economic 
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ties with the United States has also not proven popular at a time when US policies in 
the region are heavily criticised even by moderate political actors (White, 2005).  
 The Moroccan political system, based on both co-optation and intimidation of 
dissidents and opponents since the days of independence, still functions quite 
effectively, but its stability is much more uncertain because of the social changes 
within the country and the challenging international situation (Cohen and Jaidi, 2006). 
In particular, Morocco witnessed the unexpected growth of Islamism as a political 
force over the last fifteen years. In the past, the religious legitimacy of the Royal 
family insulated it from the criticism coming from Islamist movements, which were 
traditionally small and ‘politically inefficient’ (Munson Jr., 1991). Much of the 
criticism for the policies of Hassan II came from the Marxist and socialist left, while 
attempts to overthrow him were carried out by small groups within the military in 
1971 and 1972. The religious legitimacy of the King to rule has however diminished 
considerably and is no longer as solid as a rampart against the criticism coming from 
vast sectors of political Islam. The immunity from criticism of the Commander of the 
Faithful has disappeared, as other political actors appropriated the language and 
symbolism of religion to question the very legitimacy of the king to rule (Mohsen-
Finan and Zeghal, 2006).  
 Islamism in Morocco had ‘caused considerably anxiety in the immediate 
aftermath of the Iranian revolution’ (Munson Jr., 1991), but did not really become 
powerful until the 1990s. In the words of Laskier (2003), ‘Morocco’s problems have 
provided opportunities for Islamist movements to arise and claim they possess the 
best and perhaps only solutions.’ In this respect, Morocco is no longer different from 
the other Arab countries in the region. Faced with the growth of political Islam, the 
Royal House adopted a three-pronged strategy to ‘contain radicalism’ (Willis, 2006).  
First of all, it convinced the PJD to participate to multiparty electoral 
competitions. Thus, the PJD integrated the political system and its representatives sit 
in Parliament. In exchange for participation, the PJD accepted not to question the 
religious legitimacy of the King and refrains from challenging directly the status quo. 
In so doing, the King hoped that co-optation would decrease the appeal of Islamist 
militancy (Albrecht and Wegner, 2006), but this strategy has only been partially 
successful because the PJD does not represent the whole spectrum of Moroccan 
Islamism.  
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Secondly, following the attacks on Casablanca and the successive episodes of 
violence perpetrated by militants of the group Salafist Jihad, Mohammed VI 
reshuffled the security apparatus and granted the security services the resources and 
autonomy to carry out a very severe crackdown on all suspected militants, leading in 
the process to a considerable number of human rights abuses. While the crackdown 
was very severe, it had the support of most domestic and international political actors, 
including the PJD. Thus, the King signalled that violence to attain political objectives 
is not going to be tolerated under any circumstances.  
Finally, the King allowed the al Adl to carry on with his activities in the open, 
although the association per se is in a legal limbo and its militants are at times 
harassed. The choice to allow the movement to operate with only a modicum degree 
of interference is dictated partially by the popularity of the movement, which, through 
its social activism contributes to alleviate the harsh conditions of the poorer sectors of 
the population. In addition, the King and his advisers hope to be able to eventually co-
opt the al Adl once weakened because of the success of the King’s policies. This 
attempt to marginalise the movement has so far not been very successful.  
 In conclusion, Morocco can be defined today as a ‘liberalised autocracy’ 
(Brumberg, 2002b), where there is a degree of political pluralism and a high degree of 
civil society activism, but where ultimate decision-making power remains in the 
hands of an unaccountable leader and his advisers. In the face of the social and 
economic crisis that the country faces, the leadership has not been able to provide a 
programme of transformation that mobilised ordinary Moroccans, who, like many of 
their Arab counterparts, are increasingly attracted to Islamist groups, be they 
institutionally integrated (the PJD), politically marginalised (the Salafist Jihad) or 
socially active (the al Adl).   
 
The al Adl: organisational structure and political programme 
 Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine, and Islamic thinker and school inspector, who 
had risen to prominence in 1974 because of his open criticism of the policies of King 
Hassan II, officially founded the al Adl in 1981. At the time, the monarchy was under 
severe criticism from large sectors of society, particularly the traditionally strong left-
wing movements, and the King had personally survived two military coups. One of 
the pillars for his legitimacy remained his role as Commander of the Faithful and it is 
precisely against the notion that the Royal family had links to the Prophet that Sheikh 
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Yassine criticised the King. In an open letter titled ‘Islam or the Deluge’, the Sheikh 
‘admonish[ed] him to hold firmly to the teachings of Islam and forsake the un-Islamic 
policies he had been pursuing’ (Laskier, 2003). After such an open challenge to the 
monarch, Yassine was put in mental institution, although the challenge from Islamists 
was not particularly strong and the monarch was more preoccupied with the challenge 
coming from the left. The al Adl, since its foundation, ‘suffered from systematic 
police harassment’ (Laskier, 2003) and Yassine was placed under house arrest in 1989 
to emerge from it only ten years later. In the meantime, political Islam has become a 
much more important political force in Morocco and the al Adl benefited quite 
strongly from it. Despite remaining only a semi-legal organisation the al Adl has been 
able to expand its activities and membership to such a degree that John Entelis (2002) 
affirmed that the organisation ‘is by far the most popular Islamist group’ in the 
country.   
 The association was founded with the intention of disseminating the Sheiks’ 
writings and thinking and did not have a very clear structure. However, with the 
growth of the numbers of militants2 and the vast expansion of social services it 
became necessary to provide the groups with a much clearer structure. This has been 
done over the years and now the group has national, regional and local circles of 
militants. The militants and sympathisers then found associations organically linked 
to the Al Adl with the objective of providing specific services such as literacy classes 
or organising public conferences on various issues. In addition, militants hold 
discussion groups in private homes and proselytise among members of their social 
networks, following the same logic of recruitment of Islamist social institutions 
elsewhere (Singerman, 2004). Finally, the al Adl has a specific political aspect to its 
activism. At the national level there is a political circle that guides the strategic 
choices of the group in line with the Sheikh’s teachings, partly the product of sufi 
mysticism. The political circle is the heart of the organisation and is in charge of 
‘assuring the links with the other political actors on the Moroccan scene as well as 
defining the societal project and the political programme of the association’ (Graciet, 
2006). The political circle has three different sections: trade union affairs, women 
affairs and youth affairs. Women in fact make up almost half the membership of the 
Al Adl and are extremely active in all domains of the associations’ work.  The poster 
girl of the group is the Sheik’s daughter Nadia. The spokesperson of the group is 
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Fatlallah Arsalane, who is rumoured to be the future leader of the al Adl once the 
Sheikh passes away.  
 While the political programme of the al Adl is far from detailed, it emerges 
from the writings of the Sheikh and the pronouncements of the leading members that 
their objective is a radical transformation of the social, economic, political and 
cultural relationships that currently characterise Morocco. This transformation should 
obviously lead to the establishment of an Islamic state where sharia law would be 
implemented. In this respect, the programme for change is truly revolutionary because 
its aims to construct a political system based on Islamic rationality and spirituality 
rather than on Western modernity. From an institutional point of view the al Adl is 
favourable to the establishment of procedural democracy and the regular holding of 
elections would guarantee the accountability of elected officials. This should take 
place within the context of a new constitution, which would greatly reduce the powers 
of the monarchy. In fact, more recently, the association, via Nadia Yassine, has even 
flirted with republicanism. From an economic point of view, the economy should be 
completely reformed and Islamicised with a return to a truer market economy and not 
one dominated by corruption and lack of meritocracy. On the issue of free trade, there 
is a considerable degree of criticism for the way that the free trade agreements with 
the US and the EU have been negotiated. While quite conservative on social issues, 
the al Adl is much more favourable to equality of sexes than the PJD and the 
association performed quite a spectacular turnaround on the reform of the family 
code, switching from opposition to acceptance under the internal pressure of the 
women affairs section (Cavatorta, 2006). Foreign policy is clearly anti-Western and 
anti-Israeli, but this is not something that makes the association stand out with respect 
to the other Islamist and left-wing political actors on the Moroccan scene.    
 
No revolution and no participation: the rationale 
      The choice not to participate to the political system despite its recent 
opening up and the choice to condemn violence to overthrow the regime seem on the 
surface to prevent the al Adl from reaching its goals. In addition, in the longer run, it 
might lead to a costly isolation. The explanation for such choices is held to be the 
ideology of the movement, from which it cannot deviate. Most studies on the al Adl 
are therefore preoccupied with identifying the religious sources of the Sheikh’s 
thinking and writings. Through these sources, scholars then derive an explanation for 
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how the association operates and ‘strategises’ about the future. Thus, given the 
emphasis on dawa3 in the writings of Sheikh Yassine, this leads to focus on the social 
activism of the organisation and to examine how the group delivers social services to 
build up support. Theoretical discussions about the religious ideology underpinning 
the activities of the organisations are very useful in so far as they trace the quite 
unusual brand of Islamism that characterises the movement, combining post-Salafi 
discourse with sufi mysticism and focusing on the spiritual value of religion in 
affecting material conditions. Accordingly, it is assumed that the association believes 
that dawa will eventually lead to the establishment of the Islamic state, without the 
necessity for the group to engage directly with the state and with other political 
formations.  
However, this does not explain the creation of a political circle within the 
organisation or the many political pronouncements of its leaders or their 
preoccupation for current political events. Thus, exclusively focusing on ideological 
tenets is not helpful in analysing how the al Adl operates as a political actor. Rather 
than concentrating on religious ideology to explain behaviour, it is more useful to 
look at how institutional factors and other political actors affect it.  
 As mentioned above, the very creation of a political circle testifies that beside 
the spiritual dimension and charitable activities, the al Adl is and wishes to be very 
much involved in the political game. Unlike, however, many other Islamist 
organisations across the Muslim world and in Morocco itself, the al Adl is not seeking 
acceptance from the regime in order to participate to political life. This choice is not 
simply the product of ‘religious’ beliefs that would see participation as blasphemous 
because it would mean the acceptance of the exclusive role of the Commander of the 
Faithful. Compromising on the issue is not a price worth paying because the 
movement perceives that its current success is based on the refusal to sit at the same 
table as all the other political actors in Morocco. In this respect, the reading of the al 
Adl of the liberalising reforms and the democratic changes that Morocco has 
experienced since the arrival of Mohammed VI to the throne differs quite radically 
from the reading of all the other parties. In sum, there is nothing to gain from 
participation because the current changes are not ‘real’ and not simply because it 
would imply recognition of the figure of Commander of the Faithful. After all, Sheikh 
Yassine does not dispute the existence of such an institution per se, but disputes the 
fact that at the moment it is occupied by the Alawi dynasty (Zeghal, 2005).  
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Civil society actors, in particular the largely secular NGOs linked to the 
human rights movement and to the women’s movement, have had a considerable 
degree of praise for the liberal reforms the King introduced and they have willingly 
participated to the different forums the regime organised to discuss issues of relevance 
to the country such as the reform of the family code or the new human development 
programme to fight poverty (Author’s Interviews, 2005). While the al Adl might have 
quite a bit to contribute to such debates, it refuses to take part. This stems from the 
belief that as long as the overarching structure of government is not changed, 
incremental reforms are not going to lead to neither political transformations nor 
economic development.  
All political parties, including the Islamist PJD, legitimise the current system 
by participating to the elections, subject to the conditions of the Palace. The King and 
his advisors present such broad participation as a step toward full democratisation, but 
the interpretation of the al Adl is different. According to Mr. Arsalane ‘in Morocco 
there is no democracy, we just have the names people associate with democracy: 
parties, parliament and human rights’ (Author’s Interview, 2005). Refraining from 
being included is a rational move at the moment and the al Adl calculates that such a 
stance will be more than beneficial in the long run to the movement for a number of 
reasons.  
First of all, there is widespread dissatisfaction with political parties among 
ordinary citizens, as official parties, with the exception of the PJD, are largely 
discredited. Being associated with them in different forums and even in Parliament 
might represent a potential cost rather than a benefit. When it comes to leftist and 
secular parties, the possibilities of co-operation with them for reforming the system 
from within are very slim, as secular parties are aware of their weaknesses and would 
rally to the King in defence of their privileged position in the system rather than 
promoting changes from which they think will benefit their opponents. When it comes 
to the PJD, al Adl might end up competing with it for a significant portion of the 
‘Islamist vote’ and this would diminish the influence that the al Adl could have, 
particularly in the absence of constitutional reforms. Thus, by remaining outside the 
system, the al Adl calculates that the PJD’s choice to be included in the system will 
eventually lead to failure. The PJD is poised to make an impressive score at the 
September 2007 elections, leading it to government. However, the al Adl assumes that 
a participation of the PJD to government without prior institutional and constitutional 
 16 
changes would set the PJD up for failure, much like the USFP failed in the past to 
have influence in policy-making. This would lead to the al Adl catching the support of 
disillusioned PJD voters.  
Furthermore, the scale of change that the al Adl wishes to implement is 
considerable and would inevitably be frustrated through parliamentary participation 
where a number of compromises might be required. Such compromises, in turn, 
would lead militants and activists to question the very validity of the choice of 
participation and could potentially weaken the movement from within. Given the 
widespread lack of credibility of those who do participate in a rigged game, the al Adl 
contends that it is better to exploit its role as the outsider that does not compromise. 
The obvious cost of this strategy is that the al Adl is marginalising itself and that, 
particularly in the case of genuine democratic reforms being introduced, it will 
become an irrelevant actor, as its support is likely to shift to a successful PJD.  
The PJD, which could represent a potential ally in the struggle to Islamise 
Morocco, is perceived as a competitor and the relationship between the two actors is 
fraught with difficulties. The PJD, in order to participate and ‘enter’ the political 
system had to proclaim its allegiance to the King, whose religious authority is not 
questioned, and also had to restrain its electoral ambitions. The PJD ‘plays the game’ 
and hopes to reap the benefits of participation in the long run. Such participation is 
unacceptable to the al Adl, which would participate only on the condition that the role 
of the King was constitutionally diminished before the setting up of new rules of the 
game and on the condition that there would be no obstacles to the free will of the 
people. On Al Jazeera, Nadia Yassine (2007) recently stated that ‘our movement is 
one of da'wa, which enjoins on us not to fish in troubled waters, nor fall into the traps 
of political scheming. The movement will not participate unless it has guarantees that 
it will participate in a real political process, not in a comedy, and that it will not be 
imprisoned in the vicious circle of carrying out instructions from the high echelons of 
power.’4 Given that policy-making power is in the hands of the King, the al Adl 
calculates that they would lose support if they participated to institutions that are 
believed to be unable to affect change after investing so many resources and 
legitimacy capital in condemning the system. Mr. Arsalane had this to say about the 
other political actors that have decided to enter the state’s institutions: ‘theirs is a 
hypocritical stance because they participate in government. They are just pretending 
to be in opposition to the ruler; in reality they are fully part of the Makhzen’ (Author’s 
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Interview, 2005). As much as ideology, rational calculations seem to be central to the 
decision to refrain from compromising. It is implicit from the declarations of some 
members of the al Adl that if more significant changes were introduced and the waters 
were to become less troubled, they might revise their decision.   
Holding out is rational for a second reason. There is diminishing popular 
support for both left wing parties and for civil society organisations associated to the 
left and run by former leftist political dissidents. Diminishing support forces such 
organisations, in order to achieve some of their objectives, to rely on the King for 
support when it comes to modify legislation or obtain funding. In this manner the 
King becomes the all important arbiter and ties his fate to the fate of the liberal 
reformers who are aware of the growing impact of Islamism and are therefore keen to 
stop it. As Brumberg (2003) noted, ‘in the Middle East […] fear of Islamist victories 
has produced “autocracy with democrats”, as key groups that might choose 
democracy, absent an Islamist threat, now actively support or at least tolerate 
autocrats.’ While there are certainly many points of disagreement between Islamist 
groups and such civil society organisations, on some themes they actually have room 
for co-operation. For instance there is a commonality of interests in the respect for the 
rights of prisoners and on a number of socio-economic rights such as the sexual 
exploitation of children. Despite such coincidence of interests, the level of co-
operation between the al Adl and the secular sectors of civil society is quite low. The 
organisation is in fact keen to distance itself from what it perceives to be a ‘un-holy’ 
alliance with groups that not only differ ideologically from the al Adl, but also tend to 
be seen by many ordinary Moroccans as the representatives of post-colonial elites 
disconnected with the real needs of the population (Wiktorowicz, 2004). While both 
sectors draw militants and support from the educated middle-classes, their ideological 
and cultural references are almost irreconcilable. The successful French-educated and 
French-speaking middle classes are perceived to be the new instruments through 
which Morocco is being re-colonised. Furthermore, the al Adl, because of the extent 
of its social welfare programme, can claim to be speaking for the poor and 
marginalised. The al Adl refrains from creating official links with these secular civil 
society groups because it sees them not only as ideological enemies, but because it 
assumes that they are not interested in a process of change that will reveal their 
weakness in society to the benefit of Islamism.   
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A third reason for holding out is the complicated relationship is with the 
Palace. The King is not in principle against the direct participation of the al Adl and 
there have been extensive contacts between the two actors to try to strike a deal that 
would suit both actors. Nadia Yassine (2007) stated that ‘the regime tried more than 
once to negotiate with the movement’, but the al Adl has so far refused because it 
would be obliged to recognise the religious primacy of the King. Aside from being 
highly a contested theological point, such recognition is perceived within the 
organisation to be the beginning of a co-optation with negative consequences for the 
movement. The attitude of all of the other players in the system is that such 
recognition is the price to be paid for entering institutional politics and attempting to 
then impose democratisation on the monarchy. For the al Adl however the strategy of 
the other players is fundamentally flawed because by participating they then give up 
the right to deny legitimacy to the monarchy. Such denial of legitimacy is what, 
according to the al Adl, would trigger the necessary radical transformation of the 
political system. This is the reason why the organisation calls for a constitutional 
assembly that would discuss such matters without the interference of the King. While 
it is widely believed the monarchy as an institution is both popular among ordinary 
Moroccans and necessary for political stability, the al Adl banks on the fact that such 
popularity is diminishing with the growing economic and social difficulties of the 
country. International events also compound problems for the King, who is a 
supporter of the war on terror, but seems unable, through his western allies, to obtain 
satisfactory results on issues of great concern for ordinary Moroccans such as the 
Israeli occupation of Palestine. Thus, being seen to have legitimised the policy-
making role of the monarchy for such a long time is not going to prove popular with 
citizens. The al Adl however keeps its distance from the monarchy, criticises it from 
the outside and pours scorn on those political actors that have been co-opted in 
exchange for some privileges. This strategy is believed to lead to a strengthening of 
the organisation, which will be the main beneficiary of the disillusionment of ordinary 
citizens with their system of government. Some commentators also share this negative 
view of the monarchy’s performance and the potential danger it runs (Tuquoi, 2001).  
Remaining outside the institutional game might have a number of benefits, but 
it also carries a number of potential costs and the al Adl is quite aware of that. The 
first potential cost is that by choosing to stay out of institutional politics, the 
organisation will miss out on the opportunity to influence the future direction of the 
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country if the situation presented itself were the King to decide that full 
democratisation was the solution to the ills of Morocco. In that case the parties 
already present within the state institutions might benefit from their past 
compromising attitude, as they could claim to have been decisive in influencing the 
king’s decision. The al Adl leadership is however very sceptical of this possible 
change of heart of the King and this is the reason why more recently they have been 
provoking the monarchy through the ‘republican card.’ The second potential cost is 
that by not directly engaging the state and with a deteriorating socio-economic 
situation, more radical and violent elements might out-flank the al Adl. There is a 
clear recognition of this danger. As Arsalane mentioned, ‘we believe that democracy 
is the solution…. the alternative is radical violence’ (Author’s interview, 2005). The 
attacks in Casablanca seem to confirm such fears. Thus, the second potential cost is 
perceived as being a very real possibility. The al Adl has a very long tradition of 
condemning the use of violence and it is partly the product of experience. The salafi 
groups are not popular and the vast majority of ordinary citizens perceive them to be 
dangerous and detrimental to the well-being of Morocco, as the anti-terror marches 
indicate. Violence is therefore not an option for the organisation because it would lead 
many activists away and it would trigger state repression with the subsequent inability 
to carry out other important social welfare activities, which attract supporters. It is 
also not an option because it would alienate a great number of members who have 
bought into the spiritual aspect of the organisation and would not be keen on the use 
of violence. Finally, the leadership is very well aware of the fact that violence has not 
led to the achievement of political objectives in any other Arab society, where salafi 
groups have all failed to get to power. 
Thus, the al Adl remains in a sort of limbo, having chosen neither participation 
nor revolution to achieve its objectives. This attitude does not necessarily indicate 
strategic confusion nor blind ideological commitment, but can explained through an 
analysis of the environment surrounding the organisation, which seems to be biding 
its time before committing to a course of action that the al Adl believes will deliver on 
its objectives for Morocco.  
 
Conclusion 
 The literature on opposition movements in the Middle East and North Africa, 
and particularly the one dealing with Islamist movements, tends to overwhelmingly 
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focus on attempting to discover the true nature of such movements in order to make 
claims about their democratic credentials or lack thereof. This usually leads to a rather 
sterile debate about their ideological positions as if they were fixed both in space and 
time. This is because Islamist movements tend not to be analysed through the 
assumptions of rationality that comparative politics provides. The outcome is that the 
surrounding environment is not taken into the due consideration and the rational 
calculations that such movements might make are neglected when it comes to explain 
why they operate the way they do and make the choices they make. The debate about 
the true nature of Islamist formations takes place because of the highly controversial 
nature of the conflation between religion and ideology that Islamist groups embody, 
but it overlooks the rational calculations that Islamist movements make when active in 
dynamic relationships with other political actors. This research does not 
underestimate the relevance of the ideological tenets derived from religion and how 
they affect the decision-making process of such groups. It fully recognises that 
Islamist movements have unique characteristics due to the influence that ‘divine 
revelation’ has on their ideological beliefs.  However, studies on Islamist movements 
cannot be simply reduced to one dimension and can benefit from the findings of the 
wider literature on comparative politics on the rationality of political actors. Thus, the 
research deems it important to underline that there might be a neglected component to 
the decision-making of Islamist groups. Such component is constraints and conditions 
that the surrounding environment presents, particularly in terms of relations with other 
actors. Thus, this environment offers different courses of action subject to institutional 
constraints and subject to the choices that other players in the system make.  
Following from Pripsetin-Posusney (2002), it is therefore interesting and useful to 
look at how of Islamists strategise in an authoritarian context and within a framework 
of rational behaviour.  
 The case of the al Adl in Morocco is particularly significant because the 
movement refuses both participation and violence to achieve its objectives. This is not 
simply the product of its ideological allegiance to dawa and social activism, but is 
also the product of Moroccan ‘liberalised autocracy’, where the King plays a complex 
game of ‘divide and conquer’ in order to remain thee exclusive decision-maker. The 
findings indicate that in such a game the al Adl calculates its costs and benefits 
through its reading of the relationships that it has with the monarchy, with other 
political parties and with civil society actors and through its reading of where 
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Moroccan society as a whole stands with respect to the most important issues the 
country faces. The al Adl has come to the conclusion that democracy is the way 
forward, but wishes to change the rules of the game before engaging directly in 
politics and banks on the dissatisfaction of the public with the monarchy to hold out 
and keep thriving. These ‘subtle calculations’ are meant to strengthen the bargaining 
position of the association and lead it in the future to conquer political power on its 
own terms and with the prospect of radically transforming society. Given the 
popularity of Islamism in Morocco, these calculations might be correct (Beau and 
Graciet, 2006).  
 While the al Adl’s choices are certainly the product of specifically Moroccan 
conditions, an approach based on clarifying how the environment conditions strategic 
calculations can have more general applicability in the study of Islamist movements. 
The main finding from this research seems to be that while religion as an ideology is 
important in giving a direction and a theoretical framework of understanding of reality 
to movements that define themselves as religious, such movements are also rational 
political actors whose objectives are shaped as much by political realities as they are 
by ideologies. This is good news for those policy-makers in the West who might 
decide to take the chance of engaging such groups.  
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Notes                           
                                                 
1
 This is the case for example of the Italian and Spanish Communist parties, which over time integrated 
the liberal-democratic system they were so critical of and became active supporters of the system.  
2
 The spokesperson of the organisation refused to say how many members the group has and thus it is 
impossible to have a definite figure. By most accounts the organisations seems to be able to count on at 
least 50,000 committed militants and up to 500,000 sympathisers. At demonstrations on Palestine and 
Iraq or against the reform of the family code, the al Adl was able to mobilise over a million people each 
time.     
3
 The concept of dawa can be equated to propagation of the faith. It has become a politically important 
concept because it does not simply mean proselytising, it ‘becomes the very act of activating Islam 
through deed in all spheres of life’ (Clark, 2004). This includes being politically active and strive to 
create the conditions for changing the nature of society through ‘public virtue and personal piety’ 
(Clark, 2004), which will eventually lead to the establishment of the Islamic state from below.      
4
 Transcripts of the interview are available at www.nadiayassine.net Accessed on April 12th 2007.  
